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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge: 
 
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Laurel Highlands School District and its assistant principal, 
Michael Carbonara, on a student, Rhonda Gottlieb's, 
excessive force claims under 42 U.S.C. S 1983. Gottlieb filed 
her S 1983 suit in the Fayette County Court of Common 
Pleas along with a state assault and battery claim. The 
matter was then removed to the District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania and referred to a 
Magistrate Judge. Appellees filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, which the Magistrate Judge recommended be 
granted. The District Court agreed and granted the motion 
on the S 1983 claims. The assault and battery claim was 
remanded to the Fayette County Court of Common Pleas. 
Appellant Gottlieb contends on appeal that there remain 
issues of material fact with respect to appellee Carbonara, 
and facts ignored by the District Court, which would 
establish "municipal liability" with respect to her claims 





On or about February 9, 1996, Rhonda Gottlieb, then a 
junior at Laurel Highlands Public High School, entered the 
school with the intention of confronting another female 
student, Leah Saluga, about her relationship with Gottlieb's 
ex-boyfriend. Gottlieb was a disruptive student with a 
lengthy disciplinary record at the school. On this day she 
arrived late and apparently did not plan on attending 
classes. Upon her arrival, Gottlieb proceeded directly to 
Saluga's classroom. The two argued without physically 
engaging each other, and a school security officer arrived. 
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The security officer instructed Gottlieb to leave the building, 
but Gottlieb disobeyed and continued to threaten Saluga. 
The security officer then escorted Gottlieb to the principal's 
office. 
 
Gottlieb stood in the doorway of assistant principal 
Michael Carbonara's office while he spoke with a teacher. 
Carbonara then allegedly began yelling at Gottlieb and 
spoke a few words to another principal, Robert Raho. Raho 
then told Gottlieb that he had just been on the phone with 
Gottlieb's mother and that Gottlieb was not allowed in 
school until a parent-teacher conference took place. 
According to Gottlieb, Carbonara then told her to"shut up, 
because he didn't want to hear nothing [sic][s]he had to 
say" and pushed her shoulder with his hand, propelling her 
backwards into a door jam. As a result of this contact, 
Gottlieb's lower back struck the door jam. Gottlieb 
described the encounter in her deposition: 
 
       Q. Were you caused to fall to the floor from this being 
       pushed? 
 
       A. No. Its [sic] not like he pushed me to try to knock 
       me out or anything. He didn't! its [sic] not like he like 
       hauled off [and] like cold-cocked me to knock me out. 
       It wasn't like that. He was just in a fit of rage, and he 
       was mad. And he was yelling, and it happened. 
 
       Q. Is it your belief that Mr. Carbonara intended to force 
       you into the doorjamb? 
 
       A. No. Why would he just all of a sudden hit me? I 
       never did nothing to the man. 
 
       Q. Is it your belief that Mr. Carbonara intended to hurt 
       you at all? 
 
       A. No, I just think he was mad, and he didn't know 
       what he was doing. 
 
       Q. And do you know why he was mad? 
 
       A. Probably because I was up there acting like an 
       immature kid at the high school. I shouldn't have been 
       there, and I went there. 
 
Gottlieb alleges that she suffers chronic back pain and 
cramping as a result of this impact. She has been treated 
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by several doctors and chiropractors for the injury. She has 
been advised to avoid strenuous activities involving her 
back, and she has not been able to perform various jobs or 
participate in some leisure activities. 
 
Carbonara was earlier involved in a physical altercation 
with an opposing football coach, and Gottlieb therefore 
argues that the School District is liable because of its 




A. Gottlieb's S 1983 Claim Against Carbonara 
 
i) The Specific Constitutional Right Allegedly Infringed 
 
We first must "identify[ ] the specific constitutional right 
allegedly infringed" and determine if Gottlieb's claim should 
be reviewed under the Fourth, Fifth, or Fourteenth 
Amendment. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394, 109 S. 
Ct. 1865, 1870 (1989). Because different standards attach 
to the various rights, identifying the proper constitutional 
approach is essential. Here, the difference between 
reviewing Carbonara's actions under the reasonableness 
standard of the Fourth Amendment or the shocks the 
conscience standard of the Fourteenth Amendment may be 
determinative. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis , 523 U.S. 
833, 118 S.Ct. 1708 (1998); Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 
F.3d 1296, 1303 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc). 
 
Because the Fourth Amendment invokes the less 
stringent reasonableness standard, Gottlieb argues that 
Carbonara's push amounts to a seizure effectuated by a 
government actor who "by means of physical force or show 
of authority, . . . in some way restrain[ed] the liberty of a 
citizen." Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10. The Fourth 
Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures, 
however, does not properly cover Gottlieb's alleged injury. 
Courts have recognized that public schools are in a"unique 
constitutional position," because "[o]nce under the control 
of the school, students' movement and location are subject 
to the ordering and direction of teachers and 
administrators." Wallace by Wallace v. Batavia Sch. Dist. 
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101, 68 F.3d 1010, 1013 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Vernonia 
Sch. Dist. 47 J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655, 115 S. Ct. 
2386, 2392 (1995) (students are lawfully subject to a level 
of restraint that would be unacceptable if "exercised over 
free adults."). The Fourth Amendment's "principal concern 
. . . is with intrusions on privacy," and therefore when the 
infraction deals not "with the initial decision to detain an 
accused and the curtailment of liberty that such a decision 
necessarily entails, but rather with the conditions of 
ongoing custody following such curtailment of liberty," then 
the claim invokes principles of substantive due process. 
Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 674, 97 S. Ct. at 1401 (citation 
omitted). Gottlieb did not experience the type of detention 
or physical restraint that we require to effectuate a seizure. 
As the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
correctly stated, the "momentary use of physical force by a 
teacher in reaction to a disruptive or unruly student does 
not effect a `seizure' of the student under the Fourth 
Amendment," and therefore "is a scenario to which the 
Fourth Amendment does not textually or historically apply." 
Kurilla by Kurilla v. Callahan, 68 F. Supp. 2d 556, 563 
(M.D. Pa. 1999). 
 
Gottlieb's action is a claim of excessive force, not of 
unreasonable detention. In our leading case reviewing 
corporal punishment in public schools under S 1983, 
Metzger v. Osbeck, 841 F.2d 518, 520 (3d Cir. 1988), we 
did not explicitly adopt the shocks the conscious standard, 
but rather did so impliedly, stating that the offending 
conduct must be inspired by malice or sadism. This led 
Judge Weis to state in his dissent that the majority had 
"apparently adopted" the shocks the conscience standard. 
Metzger, 841 F.2d at 522 (Weis, J., dissenting). We agree 
and take this opportunity to clarify the standard we 
adopted in Metzger, applying the Fourteenth Amendment's 
shocks the conscience standard to federal claims alleging 
the use of excessive force by public school officials. Accord, 
Johnson by Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist. , 239 
F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2001); Neal by Neal v. Fulton County Bd. 
of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2000); Lillard v. Shelby 
County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716 (6th Cir. 1996); Wise v. 
Pea Ridge Sch. Dist., 855 F.2d 560 (6th Cir. 1988); Garcia 
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by Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1987); Webb v. 
McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151 (6th Cir. 1987). 
 
ii) Application of the Shocks the Conscience Standard 
 
The substantive component of the Due Process Clause 
"protects individual liberty against `certain government 
actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to 
implement them.' " Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 
125, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 1068 (1992) (quoting Daniels v. 
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331, 106 S. Ct. 662, 665 (1986)). 
"[T]he substantive component of the due process clause is 
violated by [state conduct] when it can properly be 
characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a 
constitutional sense." County of Sacramento , 523 U.S. at 
847, 118 S. Ct. at 1717 (citation omitted). Thus,"conduct 
intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any 
government interest is the sort of official action most likely 
to rise to the conscience-shocking level." Id. at 849, 118 S. 
Ct. at 1718. 
 
In Metzger, 841 F.2d at 520, we cited Johnson v. Glick, 
481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973), for the standard to 
evaluate excessive force claims: 
 
       In determining whether the constitutional line has 
       been crossed, a court must look to such factors as the 
       need for the application of force, the relationship 
       between the need and the amount of force that was 
       used, the extent of injury inflicted, and whether force 
       was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore 
       discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very 
       purpose of causing harm. 
 
The Fourth Circuit refined the Glick criterion in Hall v. 
Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980). Hall now 
provides the most commonly cited test for claims of 
excessive force in public schools: 
 
       As in the cognate police brutality cases, the 
       substantive due process inquiry in school corporal 
       punishment cases must be whether the force applied 
       caused injury so severe, was so disproportionate to the 
       need presented, and was so inspired by malice or 
       sadism rather than a merely careless or unwise excess 
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       of zeal that it amounted to a brutal and inhumane 
       abuse of official power literally shocking to the 
       conscience. Not every violation of state tort and 
       criminal assault laws will be a violation of this 
       constitutional right, but some of course may. 
 
Hall, 621 F.2d at 613 (citation omitted). 
 
The Glick and Hall standard has been adopted with slight 
variations by several Courts of Appeals. See Johnson, 239 
F.3d at 251-52 ("[I]n determining whether the constitutional 
line has been crossed," the Court must consider"the need 
for the application of force, the relationship between the 
need and the amount of force that was used, the extent of 
injury inflicted, and whether force was applied in a good 
faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously 
and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm."); 
Neal, 229 F.3d at 1075 ( "[E]xcessive corporal punishment 
. . . may be actionable under the Due Process Clause when 
it is tantamount to arbitrary, egregious, and conscience- 
shocking behavior . . . . [T]he plaintiff must allege facts 
demonstrating that (1) a school official intentionally used 
an amount of force that was obviously excessive under the 
circumstances, and (2) the force used presented a 
reasonably foreseeable risk of serious bodily injury."); P.B. 
v. Koch, 96 F.3d 1298 (9th Cir. 1996); Wise , 855 F.2d at 
563 ("[A] substantive due process claim in the context of 
disciplinary corporal punishment is to be considered under 
the following test: 1) the need for the application of corporal 
punishment; 2) the relationship between the need and the 
amount of punishment administered; 3) the extent of injury 
inflicted; and 4) whether the punishment was administered 
in a good faith effort to maintain discipline or maliciously 
and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm."). 
 
To avoid conflating the various elements of the shocks 
the conscience test into a vague impressionistic standard, 
we analyze its four elements in turn: a) Was there a 
pedagogical justification for the use of force?; b) Was the 
force utilized excessive to meet the legitimate objective in 
this situation?; c) Was the force applied in a good faith 
effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and 
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm?; and d) 
Was there a serious injury? 
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The first question is whether there was a pedagogical 
justification for Carbonara's use of force. Corporal 
punishment in schools typically refers to the application of 
physical force by a teacher or administrator to punish a 
student for some type of school-related misconduct. See 
Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 661, 97 S. Ct. at 1407. The most 
common application of physical force involves the formal 
administration of paddlings or other predesignated physical 
punishment. See Saylor v. Board of Educ., 118 F.3d 507, 
511 (6th Cir. 1997); Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 806 (5th 
Cir. 1990); Wise, 855 F.2d at 562; Garcia, 817 F.2d at 653; 
Hall, 621 F.2d at 609. Informal physical confrontations 
have also been considered corporal punishment. See Neal, 
229 F.3d at 1060 (coach's striking student in face with a 
metal weight and destroying his eye considered corporal 
punishment); London v. Directors of DeWitt Pub. Schs., 194 
F.3d 873, 875 (8th Cir. 1999) (school official's dragging 
student across room and banging student's head against a 
metal pole described as corporal punishment); P.B., 96 F.3d 
at 1300 (principal's hitting, grabbing, and pushing of 
several students actionable as a constitutional violation); 
Metzger, 841 F.2d at 518 (school official's placing student 
in choke hold and causing student to lose consciousness 
and fall to the pavement resulting in a broken nose and 
fractured teeth analyzed under corporal punishment 
framework). In such cases where a school official grabs a 
student to break up a fight, chokes a student when hearing 
him curse, or paddles a student for misbehaving, the 
reason that the administrator resorts to force is evident. At 
the very least, the force must be capable of being construed 
as an attempt to serve pedagogical objectives. 
 
Here it is unclear what pedagogical objective Carbonara's 
alleged push might have served. Although insubordinate 
earlier, Gottlieb stood in Carbonara's doorway obediently. 
Gottlieb was informed that she was not allowed in school 
until after a parent-teacher conference took place. There 
appears at this point to have been no reason for Carbonara 
to physically discipline Gottlieb, and he has not offered any 
justification for the alleged act. As the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals has stated, "[c]orporal punishment rises to the level 
of a constitutional deprivation only when it is arbitrary, 
capricious, or wholly unrelated to the legitimate state goal 
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of maintaining an atmosphere conducive to learning." 
Woodard v. Los Fresnos Indep. Sch. Dist., 732 F.2d 1243, 
1246 (5th Cir. 1984). Carbonara has not yet offered any 
justification for his use of force, and it is thus possible that 
a reasonable jury could find that there was no justifiable 
need for any use of force against Gottlieb. Carbonara's 
push could be found to be a rash, irrational, and needless 
abuse of his authority. Consequently, it is inappropriate to 
presume in his favor on this point and in the context of 
summary judgment. 
 
The second question is whether the force Carbonara 
utilized was excessive to accomplish the legitimate objective 
in this situation. Because we have concluded that there 
was no need for Carbonara to use force at all, excessivity is 
simply not an issue. Carbonara's use of force may not have 
been in service of any pedagogical objective, but rather 
could have been an unwarranted fit of "rage" (as Gottlieb 
described it in her deposition). Hence, summary judgment 
is inappropriate on this prong of the test. As the Supreme 
Court stated in Sandin v. Connor, "[a]lthough children sent 
to public school are lawfully confined to the classroom, 
arbitrary corporal punishment represents an invasion of 
personal security to which their parents do not consent 
when entrusting the educational mission to the State." 515 
U.S. 472, 485, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2300-01 (1995). In this 
respect, school officials risk federal constitutional liability 
claims if they subject their students to force that does not 
serve any appropriate pedagogical objective. 
 
The third question is whether the force applied by 
Carbonara "was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or 
restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very 
purpose of causing harm." Metzger, 841 F.2d at 520 
(quoting Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033). In essence, we are asked 
to examine what animated Carbonara's action or his intent 
in acting. There are three possibilities: 1) Carbonara did not 
intend to push Gottlieb or cause her injury, and therefore 
the contact was accidental; 2) Carbonara intended to push 
Gottlieb but not to cause her injury, and therefore the 
injury was accidental; 3) Carbonara intended to push 
Gottlieb and cause her injury. Because a constitutional 
violation will only arise if Carbonara's actions were 
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malicious and sadistic, it is the harm, and not the contact, 
that must be intended.1 Therefore only the third possibility 
can sustain her claim. 
 
In Metzger, we reasoned that the teacher's statement that 
he did not intend to harm the student, by itself, was not 
enough to establish conclusively that the teacher did not 
intend to harm the student by placing him in a choke hold. 
Metzger, 841 F.2d at 520-21. We reasoned that the 
teacher's position as a physical education instructor and 
wrestling coach may make him aware of the risks in 
restraining the student. Id. Since the Metzger court found 
contradictory evidence of what the teacher intended, 
summary judgment was inappropriate on the facts 
presented. Here, unlike Metzger, we are faced with a 
different scenario because of the slight nature of the push 
and Gottlieb's own testimony. First, Carbonara did nothing 
more than place his hand on Gottlieb's shoulder and push 
her back inches to the door jamb. The push itself was so 
minor that even if the injuries she alleges occurred, it 
cannot be inferred from the act itself that Carbonara 
intended to act maliciously and sadistically so as to 
constitute a constitutional violation. A slight push is very 
different than the choke hold applied in Metzger . Second, in 
her deposition Gottlieb explicitly stated that she believed 
that Carbonara did not intend to injure her. (See opinion p. 
3, supra). 
 
Thus, Carbonara's conduct, although possibly tortious, 
does not give Gottlieb a constitutional cause of action. 
Carbonara's placing his hand on a student's shoulders and 
moving her mere inches is not "a brutal and inhumane 
abuse of official power literally shocking to the conscience."2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The use of the term "sadistic" in this standard is something of a 
misnomer. Precedent does not require that the alleged offender take 
pleasure or satisfaction from the injury, as the term entails, but rather 
only that the offender intended harm. The requirement that the act be 
sadistic, therefore, adds nothing to the requirement that it be malicious. 
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 956-58 (6th ed. 1990). 
 
2. We base our conclusion on Carbonara's lack of intent to injure 
Gottlieb, and therefore do not need to determine whether the alleged 
injury was sufficient to support a constitutional claim. 
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Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d at 613. Applying the summary 
judgment standard, we conclude that no reasonable jury 
could find that Carbonara intended to harm Gottlieb. 
Therefore, his actions do not rise to the level of a 
constitutional violation. 
 
B. Gottlieb's S 1983 Claim Against the School District 
 
Gottlieb claims that Carbonara's previous altercation with 
an opposing football coach was handled by school 
administration in such a way as to constitute deliberate 
indifference to physical abuse of students generally, and 
created a policy, practice, or custom that caused her injury 
specifically. We do not agree. 
 
We have recognized that a municipality will be liable for 
the constitutional violations of a state actor if it acts "with 
deliberate indifference to the consequences [and] 
established and maintained a policy, practice or custom 
which directly caused constitutional harm." Stoneking v. 
Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(emphasis added). Gottlieb has failed to allege a direct 
casual connection between any such practice and her 
injury. See Losch v. Borough of Parkesburg, Pa. , 736 F.2d 
903 (3d Cir. 1984). This causal connection can be 
established by alleging "that policymakers were aware of 
similar conduct in the past, but failed to take precautions 
against future violations, and that this failure, at least in 
part, led to their injury." Id. at 910. The previous conduct 
is not sufficiently similar to draw a direct causal connection 
to Gottlieb's injury. 
 
Because Gottlieb has not alleged sufficient facts to 
establish causation, we need not consider whether the 
School District acted with deliberate indifference and 
established and maintained an unconstitutional policy, 
practice, or custom. The District Court therefore did not err 
in granting summary judgment against Gottlieb'sS 1983 




In sum, we conclude that there are no material issues of 
fact that would preclude granting summary judgment in 
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favor of Carbonara, and that the District Court properly 
concluded that Gottlieb's pleading was insufficient to 
establish a cause of action against the School District. We 
will affirm the summary judgment in all respects. 
 
A True Copy: 
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